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These petitions raise the same constitutional 





I . - -
- 2 -
.1/ 
in Woods v. Ohio, No. 76-1308. - Bell challenges his 
conviction and sentence on various additional grounds. 
1. FACTS: Bell and Hall abducted a 64-year-old 
man while he was parking his car, and drove him to a 
cemetery; he was killed with two shotgun blasts in the head 
at close range. Bell, who was 16 at the time of the offense, 
was tried as an adult but separately from Hall. Both Bell 
and Hall were convicted of aggravated murder; a statutory 
aggravating circumstance -- that the murder was committed in 
the course of a kidnapping -- was found beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and none of the three statutory mitigating factors 
were found. Accordingly, Bell and Hall were sentenced to 
death, as required by the Ohio capital punishment statute 
(see the preliminary memo in Woods v. Ohio, supra). 
2. CHALLENGES TO OHIO's DEATH PENALTY STATUTE. Both 
-
Bell and Hall press four challenges to the Ohio scheme raised 
in Woods v. Ohio. (a) The statute is essentially a mandatory 
statute because the mitigating factors are vague and meaning-
less and do not provide for consideration of a particular 
defendant's character and record. The State and courts below 
respond that the statute on its face, and as construed by the 
Ohio supreme court, requires that the sentencing authority 
consider "the history, character, and condition of the offender " 
in determining whether one of the three mitigating circums tances 




exists. (b) The burden is on the defendant to establish 
a mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence, in 
violation of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684. (c) Ohio's 
provision for appellate review of death sentences fails to 
provide a case-by-case determination of whether the penalty 
was warranted. (d) The defendant is denied a jury determination 
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These contentions were summarily rejected ~y the Ohio 
supreme court below, as they were in Woods, ori the basis of 
the court's decision in State v. Bayless, 357 N.E. 2d 1035 
(Nov. 1976). For further discussion of these issues, see the 
preliminary memo in Woods. They should be disposed of in ac-
cordance with the disposition in that case. 
(e) Hall and Bell both make an additional challenge , 
not raised in Woods, to the death . penalty statute: They argue 
-
that the statute impermissibly burdens the exercise of their 
jury trial right, citing Jackson v. United States, 390 U.S. 570, 
by imposing the death penalty for a defendant who waives jury 
trial only if a three - judge panel unanimously f~~ds no mitigating 
circumstance but imposing death for a defendant who elects jury 
trial if the trial judge finds no mitigating circumstance; in 
other words, a defendant who waives need convince only one of 
three judges to avoid the death penalty, but a defendant who 
elects a jury must convince the one judge who makes the decision. 







reasons. First, in Jackson, the waiver of jury trial 
eliminated the possibility of death altogether, whereas 
here it at most reduces the possibility. Second, by 
petrs' own logic the 12-person jury is much easier to 
obtain an acquittal from than the one - person bench, so 
that the arguably higher chance of getting death if 
convicted after a jury trial is balanced by the arguably 
lower chance of getting convicted. Third, in the county 
where petrs were tried, 2/3 of the capital cases under the 
new Ohio sta'tute were tried to juries, evidence that the 
coercion, if any, was not substantial. 
The State relies on the court below with respect to 
this claim. I do not think it is certworthy, given the 
tenuous nature of the alleged burden. 
BELL's CONTENTIONS. (a) Bell argues that the 
imposition of the death penalty was grossly disproportionale 
to his offense, because the State did not show that he 
participated in the killing. (Bell also points out that he 
was 16 at the tjme of the penalty trial , that he had a low 
IQ, and was considered emotionally immature and abnormal, and 
had been taking drugs for several years before the killing.) • 
In the courts below, Bell did not argue dispropor tionality 
of aggr avated murde r 
but did argue that he could not be convicted/, because he did not 
participate in the actual killing. In his statement given to 
the police and admitted at trial, Bell said that he drove the 







victim from the trunk out to some bushes; that Bell heard 
pleas from the victim not to be shot, followed by a shot, 
and, after Hall returned to the car to get another shotgun 
shell, a second shot. He said he didn't know or intend 
that the victim ~ ould be killed. The courts below pointed 
l ~•-
to evidence tend to show that Bell actually participated 
in the killing, such as testimony by a witness who heard two 
car doors slam both before and after the shooting; and evidence 
that the victim had his hands clasped behind his head when he 
was shot (suggesting that he may have ?een held by someone). 
But the courts said that Bell was properly convicted of ag-
gravated murder as an aider and abettor even if he stayed in 
the car, because the evidence was sufficient to support the 
conclusion that he intended the death of the victim. Ohio 
supreme court opinion, 48 Ohio St. 2d, at 278-279; CA opn ., 
at 18-20, both in petn app. He thus hed "the klnd of culpability 
required for" aggravated murder, and could be punished as a 
principal offender. Ohio Rev. Code§ 2923.03, State's resp in 
Bell, App., 2a. 
An initial problem with this issue is whether it was 
properly raised below. Although petr challenged his sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment in the courts below, his argument 
with respect to his nonparticipation in the killing was that 
there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated 
murder. His argument here is essentially that even if he is 
guilty of aggravated murder as an aider and abettor, he is no t 
c!' 
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suffici~ntly implicated in the killing to receive the 
death penalty; the Eighth Amendment requires the State to 
add another mitigating circumstance that would prevent the 
sentencing authority from imposing death where the defendant 
does not physically participate in the actual killing. 
Assuming the issue is properly raised, it is no more 
certworthy than the nontriggerman felony murder issue re -
cently before the Court in several capital cases. Smith v. 
Texas, No. 76-5854,- cert. denied, 3/7/77; Coo"per v. Florid~, 
No. 76-6235, relisted at the April 29 Conference (issue not 
properly raised below); Livingston v. Texas, No. 76-6326, re-
listed at the May 12 Conference. If imposing the death sentence 
on a participant in a felony murder who did not kill or intend 
to kill the victim does not raise a certworthy issue, neither 
does imposing death on an aider and abettor who does have the 
intent to cause the victim's death. I think the nontrigger man 
felony murder issue is certworthyY~d probably the aider and 
abettor issue as well, although the latter would present the 
problem of drawing a line at some degree of in~o lvernent in the 
killing. 
(b) Petr argues that his statement given to the police 
at the station one week after the crime was inadmissible for 
two reasons. The first reason is that his parents were not told 
of his Miranda rights or allowed to consult with him before he 
made his statement. Bell was given three sets of Miranda warn-






his mother present. Although he said he did not want her 
present, she was notified that her son was going to be 
charged in a homicide; she declined an offer of transportation 
to the station to be with her son when he made his statement. 
Bell alleges a conflict with the Indiana supreme court, 
which held in Lewis v: State, 288 NE 2d 138 that under the 
federal Constitution "a juvenil~'s statements of confession 
cannot be used against him at a subsequent trial or hearing 
unless both he and •his parents or guardian were informed of his 
rights to an attorney ~nd to remain silent" and were given an 
opportunity to consult before waiving those rights. The Ohio 
supreme court below disagreed with the Indiana court and ap-
plied a "totality of the circumstances" test, including con-
sideration of Bell's juvenile status, in concluding that Bell 
had voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights. Given 
that Bell and his mother both rejected offers to bring her to 
the station before the statement was made, I don't think this 
case properly presents whatever conflict there may be on this 
question. 
The second reason Bell urges for excluding his statement 
is that neither he nor his mother were told that he could be 
tried as an adult and receive the death penalty for the offens e 
he was being questioned about. The court below said such ad-
vice would be mere speculation. Bell asserts that Ohio and 
Nebraska conflict with Missouri on the question whether a 
juvenile must be told that he could be prosecuted as an adult 










before his confession can be voluntary. Compare State v. 
Pike, 516 S-.W. 2d 505 (1974), and State v. McMillian, 
514 S.W. 528 (1974) (Mo.), with State v. Stewart, NW 2d 
___ , 66 Neb. Sup. Ct. J. 497 (advance sheet) (1977). Missouri 
does not have a per se rule requiring that the juvenile be 
informed that he can be tried as an adult; it views the test 
of voluntariness as whether he was awar.e of his potential 
criminal responsibility. But I suspect Bell's statement would 
have been excluded ·in Missouri. I think the correct rule is 
that in Ohio (and apparently most other states) : the voluntari-
ness of a juvenile confession is determined under the totality 
\ 
of the circumstances without any per se rules as to Miranda war_nin 
for parents or advice as to trial as an adult. Therefore I woul d 
suggest waiting for signs that the per~ rule in Missouri is 
gaining adherents before granting on this issue. 
5/12/77 
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Woods v. Ohio / 
Bell v. Ohio V"" 
Roberts v. Ohio 
Hall v. Ohio 
Dear Potter and Lewis: 
The Ohio death cases, which the Conference has recently 
decided to deny, continue to trouble me deeply. Because I 
am fearful that a simple denial of cert. or a written dissent 
from such a ·denial will impair the respect which our opinions 
in the death cases decided last Term now command, I would like 
to impose on your patience by attempting to explain why I 
believe the Ohio procedures are invalid under our opinions 
in Gregg, et al., and the per curiam opinion of the Court in 
Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, No. 76-5206 (as yet unannounced). 
Ohio requires that to avoid the death penalty a defendant 
convicted of capital murder must establish by a preponderance 
that either: 
"(1) The victim of the offense induced or 
facilitated it; 
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would 
have been committed, but for the fact that 
the offender was under duress, coercion, or 
strong provocation; or 
(3) The offense was primarily the product of 
the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, 
although such condition is insufficient to 







In establishing any of these mitigating circumstances, the 
I 
Ohio procedures allow for consideration of "the nature and 
'2_.i ~~stan~es ,Q_Llh.§. offense ~ d the history , character 4 and 
c ~ ion of t h e oJ fencter7 " Ohio R.C. § 29 29.04(B). As the 
Ohio Supreme- Court no ted in its seminal decision on these 
death procedures after our decisions in Gregg, et al. : 
~ 
 
"The major differences [between the Ohio pro-
cedures and those approved in Proffitt v. 
Florida] are that the Florida statute permits 
consideration of the age and prior criminal 
record of the defendant , of more broadly de-
fined mental and emotional disturbances and 
impairments, and of the fact that the defendant 
was an accomplice with only a minor role in the 
crime." State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 87 







appear to give a narrow reading to the scope of ~ 
factors considered under the Ohio procedures . 
The State, however, argues with some force that later 
decisions have significantly broadened the consideration of 
mitigating factors: 
"The Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly held 
that the mitigating circumstances are not to 
~ 
~ be construed narrowly and that relevant factors, such as prior criminal record and the age of the 
defendant, are to be considered by the sentencing 
authority, State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St.2d 270, 
280-283 (1976); State v. Black, 48 Ohio St. 2d 
262, 267-268 (1976); State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St. 
2d 127, 133-138 (1976); and State v. Osborne, 
49 Ohio St.2d 135, 145-147 (1976). Through the 
state appellate procedure each of the mitigating 
circumstances in Section 2929.04(B) has undergone 
close judicial scrutiny." Woods v. Ohio, 76-1308, 
Brief in Opposition, 8-9. - -
Indeed, in a number of cases the Ohio Supreme Court has stated 
that the three mitigating circumstances must "be strictly con-
strued in favor of the defendant, to allow the broadest con-
sideration of mitigating circumstances consistent with their 
language." State v . Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 73,86. In State 
v. Woods, 48 Ohio St. 2d 127, 136-138, the court made clear 
that in considering the second mitigating circumstance, whether 
the defendant was acting "under duress, coercion or strong 
provocation" all relevant information should be considered 
including the age, sex, health, mental condition and prior 
criminal record of the defendant and the nature and circum-
stances of his crime. In State v. Black, 48 Ohio St. 2d 262, 
268, the court wrote of the third mitigating circumstance: 
- - -- 3 -"Thus, broadly defined and however construed, 
any mental state or incapacity may be con-
sidered in light of all the circumstances and 
including the nature of the crime itself so 
that it may be determined whether the condition 
found to have existed was the primary producing 
cause of the offense." 
And in State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 282, the court 
held that a defendant's age "is a primary factor in deter-
mining the existence of a mental deficiency." Thus, it ;ls I 
clear, as the State contends, that Ohio allows for conpid-
erati_Qn of a broad ran~e of factors in determining the 
existence of any of the three mitigating factors. 
I am concerne<i, however, that this consideration is not 
meaningful becFuse of qie strictures imposed by the requi;e-
ment that the 1 defendant e2 tablish one of the three mitigyting 
factors. The case of State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St.2d 127, pro-
videsa good example. The defendant, Woods, is a young man 
without any prior criminal record, an outstanding high school 
athlete, but a person as the court noted "who was easily led 
and who came under the influence of his [co-defendant] ..•. " 
- 48 Ohio St.2d, at 138. In considering whether Woods was under 
"duress or coercion" at the time, the court took all these 
factors into account. It held, however, that since Woods had 
the opportunity to abandon the criminal scene and was not 
ordered or even urged to shoot at the victim, he could not 
have been under duress or coercion. I have no quarrel with 
the Ohio court's treatment of that issue, for it was probably 
true that Woods was under neither duress nor coercion at the 
{ 
time. Nevertheless, the defendant's youth, his lack of a 
criminal record, his athletic -success in high school and his 
mal1 e able character are all tangential at best, to the question 
of duress or coercion. Certainly, a malle able character has 
a bearing on whether duress or coercion existed, but not a 
controlling one; and, more importantly, a mallea~lecharacter 
has independent significance as a fa~~F--!i>rtpwing the possibility 
of rehabilitation. Certainly, also, youtryhas a bearing on duress 
c;,._"> I or coercion, but it has far more imp ::E:an'6e as an inde e nd nt 
/ fac or in consid e ro riet o e ea penalty. The 
ack O- a prior cr1m1na record has little bearing n uress 
or coercion, and yet under the Ohio procedures it is considered 
only in that context (and possibly in the context of a mental 
l
defect or psychosis). Its independent significance as a sen-
te cin factor is totall un er e 10 aeat procedures. 
The same can e said of such minor factors as outstanding high 
• school athletic performance. ( 
1Y 
- - -- 4 -State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, provides another example . The defendant BeIT was 16-years old at the time of the crime . 
The Ohio Supreme Court considered this factor both in relation 
to whether the defendant was under duress or coercion and in 
relation to whether his crime was a product of a mental deficiency 
or psychosis . The court rejected both propositions , noting 
that although the boy may h ave been "forced" to go along with 
the crimes, he nonetheless had the opportunity to "easily quit 
the scheme while following [the codefendantJ in another car , " 
48 Ohio St. 2d, at 282, and that although "[s]enility, as well 
a s minority, may well be relevant" to determining the existence 
of a mental deficiency, the defendant nonetheless failed to show 
that he had a mental defect. I quarrel with neither of these 
holdings, but again only note that the consideration of the 
defendant's age is only made in the context of the two releva t 
s\a u ory mi~,2-g~ ing ac ors, an is no made (indeed , cannot 
be maaer for its incrependent significance alone . Personally , 
I question whether putting to death a 16-year-old boy is cruel 
and unusual in and of itself . But that issue aside , certainly 
tthe youth of the offender ou ht to be considered inde endently r lin ermining e propriety of a =~~ -
In sum, although the Ohio procedures allow for consideration 
- of numerous factors, the consideration is not meaningful in the same sense that we use that term in our death cases . The require-ment that the defendant establish one of the three mitigating factors, precludes consideration of the independent significance 
of most of the factors which we have singled out in our opinions 
---- as crucial to a fair capital sentencing determination. Basically, 
~ 
my opinion, the Ohio rocedures preclude meaningful, cons·deration 
j}t, such f~ct2rs as e e en an sage, is prior criminal rgcord, 
1~~ s cnaracteras arehabihfative rospecf ana most of the cir-r- - umstances o the crime. cannot see how this can be squared 
with the constant reference in our opinions to the importance of 
considering "the character and record of the individual offender 
and the circumstances of a particular offense . .. . " Woodson 
-
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304.* 
*-We s-t.ruck down the statutes in Woodson and Roberts because 
their mandatory imposition of capital punishment did not allow 
"consideration of the character and record of the individual 
offender and the circumstance s of a particular offense ••. . " 
Woodson v . North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 . We noted in 
Roberts v . Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-334, that "[e]ven the 
other more narrowly drawn categories of first-degree murder in 
the Louisiana law afford no meaningful opportunity for con-
sideration of mitigating factors presented by the circumstances 
of the particular crime or by the attributes of the individual 
offender . " (Emphasis added.} We relied on both these state-







I really apologize for burdening you with a memorandum 
of this length, particularly at this time of the year ; I 
nevertheless do s o because I know you share my concern f o r a 
proper dispos i tion o f these cases even if you may still dis-
agree with my evaluation of the issue . As a fina l thought , 
I am inclined t o believe that the disproportionately large 
number of persons on death row in Ohio is at l e ast partially 




Mr . Justice Stewart 
Mr . Justice Powel l 
*(cont .) 
"Circumstances such as the youth of the offender , 
the absence of any prior conviction , the influence 
of drugs , alcohol or extreme emotional disturbance , 
and even the existence of circumstances which the 
offender reasonably believed provided a mora l 
justification for his conduct are al l examples o f 
mitigating facts which might atte nd the killing of 
a peace officer and which are considered relevant 
in other jurisdictions . " Roberts v . Louisiana , No . 
76-520 6, slip opinion at 4 . 
Similarly , in Jurek , we upheld the Texas statute only because 
the Texas courts had const r ued the answer to the second statutory 
question as allowing for consideration of the defendant 's 
criminal record , his age , whether he was acting under dures s 
or domination , and whethe r he was acting under some form o f 
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lfp/ss 6/21/77 - -
June 21, 1977 
Pending Capital Cases 
We will have, for disposition at our final Conference, 
capital cases in which the death sentence was imposed under 
statutes that we have not previously considered, namely, cases 
from Arizona, Montana and Ohio. 
The purpose of this memorandum is to identify briefly 
some - not all - of the features of the statutes of these 
three states that are asserted to be different from those in 
Georgia, Florida, Texas and Oklahoma. 
Ohio statute 
John's memo to Potter and me of May 31, provides a 
complete, and most helpful, summary of the Ohio cases and 
the alleged differences in its statute. The principal problem -
highlighted in 76-6513 Bell v. Ohio, where the defendant was 
a 16-year-old boy - is the alleged deficiency of the specified 
mitigating factors. Although apparently Ohio procedures allow 
consideration of "the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history, character and condition of the offender," 
Ohio R. C. § 29.O4(B), the Ohio court apparently has given a 
narrow reading to the mitigating factors. In State v. Bayless 
(see John's memo), it was stated that the difference between 
Ohio procedures and those approved in Proffitt are that "the 
• 
~ •· - - 2 • 
Florida statute permits consideration of the age and prior 
criminal record of the defendant", and of other factors including 
whether the defendant was "an accomplice with only a minor role 
in the crime". 
Apparently, however, subsequent Ohio decisions - again 
as pointed out by John - apparently have broadened the scope 
of the mitigating factors. On the basis of John's memo, I 
think we can now accept as current New York law the fact that 
"age of the defendant" as well as "prior cr iminal record" are 
to be considered in Ohio. In addition, in State v. Woods, 
decided shortly after Bayless, the Court construed restrictive 
language in the Ohio statute as permitting consideration 
- of all relevant information with respect to age, sex, health, 
mental condition and prior criminal record. John also cites 
State v. Black to the same effect. 
-
However, as John points out, despite the apparent . 
liberalizing of the Ohio statute, at least two of the cases 
pending here seem troubling on their facts. In both State v. 
Woods and State v. Bell, the defendants were juveniles without -
I believe - significant prior criminal records. 
Montana statute 
In 76-6714 McKenzie v. Montana, we have our first look 
at Montana's death statute. It is challenged on two grounds: 






and (ii) although the sentencing judge could consider 
unspecified mitigating circumstances, the statute itself 
provides no specific guidelines. 
Arizona statute 
3 • 
In 76-6720 Richmond _v. Arizona, the statute is challenged 
primarily on the ground that the judge alone has the sentencing 
responsibility. It is pointed out that in Gregg, Proffitt 
and Jurek, the jury also has a role. 
The Arizona statute does, however, set out in considerable 
detail the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that must 
be considered. 
-,'( -;'( -;'( ;'( 
Corrnnent: 
As presently advised, I see nothing troublesome in the 
Arizona statute. Sentencing by the judge, rather than jury, 
is traditional and appropriate where the statute itself provides 
adequate guidance. I rather think Arizona does. 
One of my clerks has suggested, however, that there are 
some additional Arizona cases in the "pipeline" that may merit 
carrying this case over until next September. I have no basis 












To: Justice Powell Date: 6/22/77 
From: TAB 
Re: McKenzie v. Montana, No. 76-6714 
The Death Penalty Issue: 
There are two issues presented here. First, is the 
fact that the Montana statute provides no guidance to the judge 
with regard to the consideration of mitigating circumstances. 
Although there is an inevitable vagueness in the definition 
pluroJ it¼ 
of mitigating circumstances, the ~A _ Sid indicate in Proffitt 
that the statement of the circumstances is important. "While 
the various factors to be considered by the sentencing authoritie: 
do not have numerical weights assigned to them, the requirements 
of Furman are satisfied when the sentencing authority's discretio1 
is guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific 
factor s that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death 
penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness 
( e1r1f I\A.~i.s o,.dde.d). 
in its imposition." 428 U.S., at 258/\ Mo;1-tana's statute ~ s 
Indeed, mitigating circumstances are presented 
~~ I ::::c::::u~~~e ~r I a pre-sentencing completely unfocused manner of considering report. 
~ ___--:::, The second issue concerns that absence of jury 
~ 
-
participation. It is true that this is the first case wit h no 
jury participation. (In Proffitt the jury was advisory, and if 
it recommended life, the judge could overrule them only on 
stringent standards.) I suppose that the community values point 
is a possible argument for such participation, but I read the 






McKenzie v. Montana, No. 76-6714 
The Mental Defect Issue: 
There are two issues here, although one of them is 
only lightly asserted. The first one is that putting the 
burden of proof on a defendant to prove the affirmative 
defense of insanity is unconstitutional. Leland stands squarely 
in the way of that argument. 
The second issue has to do with proof of the required 
mental element for deliberate homicide. This discussion is 
at p.7 of the memo. A statute allows an inference of knowledge 
and purpose from the fact of the homicide. The instruction, 
at p.7 
-/( 
n. ' g iven to the jury is significantly stronger. 
Rather than focusing on knowledge and purpose, it required 
the jury to find that the defendant "was able to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law," if they found that he did the killing. 
A companion instruction stated that defendant could overcome 
"this express direction of law" by proving by a "preponderance 
of the evidence that he suffered from such an abnormality or 
subnormality of the mind X at the time of such conduct." 
Despite the reference to preponderance of the evidence, the 
instruction also seems to suggest that all defendant need do 
is introduce a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jurors. See 
memo p. 8 
Wood's point with respect to the second issue is that 
the standard of Patterson v. New York is not met. The knowledge 
or purpose element is one of the factors that the state has 







I am inclined to agree with her that this does not meet the 
rather formalistic test set out in Patterson. However , on 
closer reflection, I see no reason to take this issue. I think 






Argued .................. . , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
- JUN 2 3 1977 Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 76-65 




Relisted for Mr . Justice Stevens . CAPITAL CASE - stay granted by 
lower court . 
~fv 
~A~ 





MERITS I MOTION 
N I POST I DIS I AFF I REV I AFF· I G D 
••••••••••••••••••••••• •••• •• ~ ••••l••••I••••• 
ABSENT I NOT VOTING 
Stevens J ..., I ) . , • , . • ... • • • • • • • • • • • 1 •• / I••• •I•••• •I••••.•• I Rehnquist J V · · · · · .,. · · · ., · · · .,. · · · ,. · · · · · '••••••••••• ••••• ✓• ••••l••••l•••••l••••t Powell J · · · .,. · · · ,. · · ·1 • • • ., •••• , •••••• •• 
J • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 ••••I••• •I•••• •I•••• •••• •I••• •I•• -I••• •I••• •I••••••••• 
Blackmun, J ............ , ..... . 
Marshall, J ............ . 
White, J ............... . 
Stewart, J ............. . 
✓1 •V..l••••l•••••l•••• ♦ ••••l••••I•• ••l••••I•••• •••••••• 
✓••••l••••l••••I••••• ►••• <I••• •I•••• I•••• •I••• •I•••• t • • • • • • • • 
✓•l••••l••••I••• i, "" ••••I••• •1• • • • • 0 •••I• 0 
•• ~ l••••l••••I••• • V ...... , .... , ......... ,. 
Burger. Ch. J ........... J. .... .I.·.·.· .l✓ ~· · · · Brennan, J ............. . 
., ... . ~ _... -...-c 
" 
..j. 
lfp/ss 10/1- 7 
October 19, 1977 
76-6513 Bell v. Ohio 
TO_!!!Y Cl~_;:~ 
On my Princeton trip, and despite the jumping and 
jerking of the Metroliner, I read the principal briefs in this 
capital case. · '·' - ·,, 
Neither brief is as helpful as it might be. The 
petr's brief, written by able counsel, attempts - in some 
respects - to reargue former capital cases. It does not quite 
focus in, as sharply as I would have liked, on the issue that 
prompted l!.S- to take the case: namely, whether the Ohio 
statute, as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court, insures 
aCil@Et'tl&e~ •adequate consideration of all relevant mitigating 
~ 
circumstances. . .. . 
The respondent's brief is almost amateurish in most 
respects. Ohio has a curious system of allowing the local 
prosecuting attorney to follow a case all the way to this 
Court. The result is that rarely is Ohio adequately 
represented. The parties are not in agreement as to the 
facts. I have not had an opportunity to review the evidence 
contained in the appendix. I would appreciate your 
identifying the relevant facts, assuming - as we must - that 






J.J... • ~ T 
2. 
having been waived) resolved all conflicting evidence in favor 
of the state. ~ ' 
I was surprised to find, from the state's brief, that 
Bell had a substantial criminal record. I do not recall that -
fact having been brought to our attention previously. 
My primary interest, as noted above, is whether at 
the sentencing stage the Ohio statute as construed allows due 
consideration of mitigating circumstances. The statute on its 
face seems inadequate to me. Therefore, it is especialJ.y 
important to make a careful examination of how it has been 
interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Cou~t. 
One additional issue that may interest the Court is 
the "trigger-man" contention. Petr asserts as a fact that 
Bell was not the trigger man, and was sitting quitely in the 
automobile without a clue as to what Hall was doing. The 
state's brief quotes the opinion of the Ohio Court of Appea l s 
to the effect that the evidence would support a finding that 
Bell was a principal and not merely an accomplice. We have 
taken a capital case to consider the question whether capital 
punishment is disproportionate with respect to a mere 
accomplice. If thjs exists is the present case, and is fairly 
before us, we may have to reach it here. On the other hand, 
'f we can accept the view of the Ohio Court of Appeals the ' 
issue may not be presented. 
- -
3. 
There is nothing, in my view, to the argument that it 
is unconstitutional for a court {in thjs case a panel of three 
judges),· rather than a jury to try a capital case. Nor is 
there anything, as I now understand the case, to the argument 
that appellate review in Ohio is too truncated. 







To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim Alt 
µ -~ 
--~------
January 12, 1978 
Re: Petitioners' "Suggestion for Postponement of Oral 
Argument" in Bell v. Ohioa, • No. 76-6513, and 
Lockett v. OhW:-No. 7"6'='6997 (attached). 
Petrs suggest that oral argument in these cases 
,....,,,.,,,, 
be postponed until a full Court can sit, noting that 
newspaper reports say Justice Brennan is not sitting this 
or next week. They contend that the Court has not heard 
a capital case with less than a full Bench at least for 
a decade, and that the consistent practice has been to 
postpone or reschedule argument where Justices become 
unable to participate. 
They also point out that there• is a danger of 
a 4-4 affirm.ance if the Court sits with just 8 Members. 
If that happened, though, I would expect the Court to hold 
the case over for reargument. 
This motion will be discussed at Conference 
tomorrow. If the practice has indeed been to postpone 
capital cases until a full bench is available, I would 
vote to follow it here. 
JA 
OFFICE OF THE CLr 
January 12, 1978 
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES 
Re: No. 76-6513 - BELL v. OHIO; and 
No. 76-6997 - LOCKETT v. OHIO 
The attached "Suggestion for 
Postponement of Oral Argument" in the 
above-entitled cases was received this 
morning and is being distributed to the 
Court at the suggestion of the Chief 
Justice. 
This document will not appear on 









SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
October Term, 1977 
No. 76-6513 
WILLIE LEE BELL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 






THE STATE OF OHIO, 
Respondent. 
SUGGESTION FOR POSTPONEMENT OF ORAL ARGUivIENT 
Petitioners, by their undersigned counsel, respectfully 
suggest that oral argument of these two cases be postponed 
until they can be heard by a full Court of nine Justices, and 
in support of this suggestion state the following: 
(1) Oral argument in these cases is presently scheduled 
to be heard on Tuesday, January 17, 1978. 
(2) A spokesman for the Court, Mr. Barrett McGurn, has 






"is not expected to participate in cases the court will hear or 
consider for the next 10 . days," on account of medical treatment. 
Washington Post, Jan. 10, 1978, at A6, col. 4 (final ed.). 
(3) The Court has a consistent practice during at leas t 
the last decade of having cases in which a party is under 
sentence of death heard by a full bench, and it has postponed 
or not. scheduled oral arguments in capital cases on several 
occasions when Justices of the Court have become unable to 
participate. See Maxwell v. Bishop, 37 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S., 
May 26, 1969) (restoring case to calendar for reargument; re-
argument scheduled for Oct. 13, 1969), 38 U.S.L.w. 3437 (May 12, 
1970) (rears ument had); Aikens v. California, Furman v. Georgia, 
Jackson v. Georgia, Branch v. Tex as, 39 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S., 
June 28, 1971) (granting certiorari; argument subsequently set 
for October, 1971), 40 u.s.L.W. 3341 (U.S., Jan. 25, 1972) (argu-
ment had); Fowler v. North Carolina, 43 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S., 
June 23, 1975) (restoring case to calendar for reargument). 
(4) A common question in the instant cases is whether 
the Ohio capital punishment statute unduly constricts con-
sideration of mitigating circumstances. Since four Justices 
of the Court have expressed the view that the death penalty 
may be imposed manditorily without any consideration of miti-
gating circumstances, Woodson v. North Ca rolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
306-24 (1976) (dissenting opinions), Stanislaus Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 337-63 (1976) (dissenting opinions), 
Harry Roberts v. Louisiana,_ U.S._, 52 L.Ed. 2d 637, 642-50 
(1977) (dissenting opinions), whereas the holding of a majority 
of the Court in the Woodson, Stanislaus Roberts and Ha rry Robe rts 
cases requires broad consideration of mitigating circumstances, 
decision of the instant cases by a Court of eight Justices pre~ 









(5) These cases present issues of literally vital importance 
not only to the two petitioners, but to 81 other inmates now under 
sentence of death in the State of Ohio pursuant to the capital 
punishment statute challenged herein. Since all of these inmates 
are presently incarcerated awaiti."B execution, the State should 
suffer no prejudice due to a delay in oral argument. 
WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully suggest that the Court 
postpone oral argument until these cases can be heard by the full 
Court. 
Dated: January 11, 1978 
\.. 
Respe~~b:itted, 
H. FRED / tlOEFLE ~ . 
CHARLES LUKEN ~ 
400 Second National Building 
830 Main Street 
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 
MAX KRAVITZ 
793 Pleasant Ridge 
Bexley, Ohio 43209 
JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
JOEL BERGER 
DAVIDE. KENDALL 
PEGGY C. DAVIS 
Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019 
ANTHONY G • AMSTERDAM 
Stanford University Law School 
Stanford, California 94305 






To: Mr. Justice Powell January 15, 1978 
From: Jim Alt 
No. 76 - 6513, Bell v. Ohio. 
The Court granted cert in this case primarily to consider 
whether the Ohio capital punishment statute, as construed by the 
Ohio Supreme Court, allows the sentencing authority to consider 
a constitutionally adequate set of factors in mitigation. Because 
of the gravity of the case, I have set forth the information 
bearing on decision in rather greater detail than usual. Although 
the case is not clear-cut, my own conclusion would be that the 





adequate range of factors in mitigation; and that petitioner 
Bell may well have been prejudiced by this inadequacy. 
Organization of this memo has presented something of 
a problem. Rather arbitrarily, I have divided it into two 
parts. In P,art I, I compare the Ohio statute and decisions 
construing it with the statutes and decisions in this Court's 
recent capital cases, and consider the arguments made on both 
sides of this case. In this Part, I do not focus on the 
characteristics of Bell and his offense, except as is 
necessary to place the Ohio Supreme Court's treatment of this 
case in .perspective with its treatment of other capital cases. 
Instead, I have devoted Part II to the detailed examination of 
Bell and his offense that your memo of October 19 regues ~ d. 
--.....,, ---!QWil ,,_., ~ ~ "'-:, 
This memo does not discuss the other issues raised by Bell, 
which I believe to be without merit. I would be happy to discuss 







I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE OHIO STATUTE. 
A. Mitigating factors in statutes and decisions in 
this Court's prior death penalty cases. P.4. 
B. The Ohio statute. P.12. 
C. Arguments. 
1. Petitioner. P.15. 
2. The State. P.18. 
D. Discussion. P.21. 
1. Distinguishing Jurek. P.l.1 . 
2. The Ohio Supre~e Court's construction and 
application of its statute. P.23. 
3. The problem whether the Constitution requires 
any particular mitigating circumstances to 
be considered. P.29. 
4. Conclusion. P.32. 
II. BELL AND THE OFFENSE. 
A. The offense. P.33. 
B. Willie Lee Bell. P.37. 
c. The Ohio Supreme Court's view of the mitigating 
factors in Bell's case. P.40. 





I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE OHIO STATUTE. 
A. Mitigating factors in statutes and decisions in this 
Court's prior death penalty cases. In order to place this 
case in perspective, I think it useful first to examine the 
death penalty statutes that this Court has considered so far, 
and the Court's view of the role and importance of mitigating 
circumstances. The statute upheld in Jurek v. Texas and the 
Court's treatment of it, will have special bearing ~n this case. 
The statute upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976), provided for bifurcated proceedings on guilt and 
penalty. At the penalty stage, the jury (or judge, in a 
non-jury trial) was to consider whether any of ten specified 
proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The statute also directed the jury or judge to "consider 
any mitigating circumstances," but the "scope of the. • • 
mitigating circumstances [was] not delineated in the statute." 
.statutory 
428 U.S., at 152. If one or more of the/aggravating circum-
stances was found beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury or judge 
could "elect[] to impose [a death] sentence, id., at 165-166 -
presumably depending on its view of the mitigating circumstances 
1/ 
in the case.-
The joint opinion of Justice Stewart, Justice Stevens, and 
you first held that Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), did 
not mean that the death penalty never can be imposed in such a 
1. However, the "jury is not required to find any mitigating 
circumstance in order to make a recommendation of mercy that is 






way as not to violate the Eighth Amendment. 428 U.S., at 168-
187. It then emphasized that the infirmity of the statute held 
invalid in Furman was that its "sentencing procedures ••• 
created a substantial risk that the [death sentence] would be 
inflicted in an arbi t rary and capricious manner." Id., at 188. 
In order to avoid this flaw it is necessary that 
"discretion in the area of sentencing be exercised in an 
informed manner. We have long recognized that 1 [f]or the 
determination of sentences, justice generally requires ••• 
that there be taken into account the circumstances of the 
offense together with the character and propensities of 
the offender.' •••• Otherwise, 'the system cannot 
function in a consistent and a rational manner.' " 
Id., at 189. Moreover, t he sentencing authority - especially -.--
if it is a jury - must be given guidelines on how to use this 
individualized information: 
"[T]he provision of relevant information under fair 
procedural rules is not alone sufficient to guarantee 
that information will be properly used in the imposition 
of punishment, especially if sentencing is performed by 
a jury •••• It seems clear, however, that the problem 
will be alleviated if the ·ur · iven guidance re ardin 
the factors about crune and the defen ant tat the State, 
representing organized society, deems particularly 
relevant to the sentencing decision." 
Id., at 192. "In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman 
• can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that 
s-. 
the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance." 
Id., at 195. 
Turning to the statute at issue in Gregg, the joint opinion 
held that it met the requirements set forth above: 
"These procedures require the jury to consider the 
circumstances of the crime and the criminal before it 





to the specific circumstances of the crime: Was it 
committed in the course of another capital felony? 
Was it committed for money? Was it committed upon a 
peace officer or judicial officer? Was it committed in 
a particularly heinous way or in a manner that endangered 
the lives of many persons? In addition, the jury's 
attention is focused on the characteristics of the person 
who committed the crime: Does he have a record of prior 
convictions for capital offenses? Are there any special 
facts about the defendant that mitigate against imposing 
capital punishment(~, his youth, the extent of 
his cooperation with~ police, his emotional state 
at the time of the crime)." 
428 U.S., at 197. The factors listed in the last parenthetical 
were drawn f r om the Georgia Supreme Court's discussion of factors 
that might be considered in mitigation in Moore v. State, 233 
865, 
Ga. 861,/213 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1975), since the statute itself 
did not specify mitigating factors. 
The statute upheld in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 
(1976), also provided for bifurcated proceedings on guilt and 
penalty. At the penalty stage, the trial judge, after receiving 
an advisory verdict from the jury based on the same factors, was 
required to decide, first, whether specified aggravating 
circumstances existed sufficient to justify a death sentence; 
and second, whether specified mitigating circumstances existed 
sufficient "to outweigh the aggravating circumstances •
11 
The 
specified mitigating circumstances were these, 428 U.S., at 
249 n.6: 
"(a) The defendant has no significant history of 
prior criminal activity. 
"(b) The capital felony was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance. 




conduct or consented to the act. 
"(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital 
felony committed by another person and his participation 
wa s relatively minor. 
"(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress 
or under the substantial domination of another person. 
"(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially 
impaired. 
"(g) The age of the defendant at the time of 
the crime." 
The joint opinion held that this procedure, too, met the 
requirements of Gregg, because it required the "sentencing 
judge [to] focus on the individual circumstances of each 
homicide and each defendant." 428 U.S., at 252. The joint 
opinion rejected the argument that the allegedly imprecise 
language of the mitigating circumstances, together with the 
- "balancing" approach mandated by the statute, left too much 
-
to the trial judge's a iscretion: 
"[T]he requirements of Furman are satisfied when the 
sentencing authority's discretion is guided and channeled 
by requiring examination of specific factors that argue 
in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty, 
thus eliminatin?i total arbitrariness and capriciousness in 
its imposition . ' (428 U.S., at 258.) 
The statute upheld in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), 
also provided for bifurcated proceedings on guilt and punishment. 
-:..---
At the punishment stage, the jury was required to answer these - - -----~-
three questions: 
"(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused 
the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and 
with the reasonable expectation that the death of the 
deceased or another would result; 
"(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute 
a continuing threat to society; and 





the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable 
in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased." 
428 U.S., at 269. The death sentence was imposed only if the 
jury found that the answer to each of these questions was yes. 
The joint opinion first held that the statute was not 
defective simply because it did not require the jury to 
consider aggravating circumstances at the penalty stage, as 
did the statutes in Gregg and Proffitt, since the State's 
"action in narrowing the categories of murders for which a 
death sentence may ever be imposed serves much the same purpose." 
428 U.S., at 270. The joint opinion went on to make it clear, 
however, that a death penalty statute also must allow consideration 
of mitigating factors: 
"[A] sentencing system that allowed the jury to 
consider only aggravating circumstances almost certainly 
would fall short of providing the individualized sentencing 
determination that we today have held in Woodson v. North 
Carolina ••• to be required ••• For such a system 
would approach the mandatory laws that we today hold 
unconstitutional ••• A jury must be allowed to consider 
!~
on the basis of all relevant e~dence not only why a death 
sentence should Ee imposed, 6ut also why it should not be 
imposed." (428 U.S., at 271.) 
Because the "Texas statute [did] not speak explicitly of 
~ 
mitigating circumstances," the constitutionality of the statute 
"turn[ed] on whether the enumerated questions .allow consideration 
of particularized mitigating factors." 428 U.S., at 272. The 
joint opinion was satisfied that the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals would interpret the second statutory question - "whether 
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
- acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to 
~ . 
- -
- society" - "so as to allow a defendant to bring to the jury's 
attention whatever mitigating circumstances he may be able to 
show." Ibid. This estimate was supported by the statement of 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that: 
In determining the likelihood that the defendant would 
be a continuing threat to society, the jury could 
consider whether the defendant had a significant criminal 
record. It could consider the range and severity of his 
prior criminal conduct. It o'Ould look further to the age 
of the defendant and •whether or not at the time of the 
commission of the offense he was acting under duress or under 
the domination of another. It could also consider whether 
the defendant was under an extreme form of mental or 
emotional pressure, something less, perhaps, than insanity, 
but more than the emotions of the average man, however 
inflamed, could withstand." \ 
Id., at 272-273, quoting 522 S.W.2d, at 939-940~ In addition, 
in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an 
- answer of yes to the second question in another case, the Texas 
-
Court of Criminal Appeals had 
"examined the defendant's prior conviction on narcotics 
charges, his subsequent failure to attempt to rehabilitate 
himself or obtain employment, the fact that he had not 
acted under duress or as a result of mental or emotional 
pressure, his apparent willingness to kill, his lack of 
remorse after the killi~ the conclusion of a 
psychiatrist that he had a sociopathic personality and 
that his patterns of conduct would be the same in the 
future as they had been in the past." (428 U.S., at 273.) 
In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), on the 
other hand, the joint opinion held that a statute imposing a 
mandatory death sentence on all persons convicted of first 
degree murder did not meet the requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment. One "constitutional shortcoming" of the statute was 
"its failure to allow the particularized consideration of 
relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted 
1~. -:t'+ s!.,,,.,U l,e. "°-f&( tl,....,t -/1.;s /;st of .f, .. t-1-.. rs dose~ 
~o..r-o..Ue!s ~ ~,+,~a.+i'} c,~e.(.)kc.S~S I ;,s-feJ. ;~ -tke A-toJ"l'Pe~J ~o~ 
A.11\.A 11..e F7ond.Q. siA-tu+e. o....J Qppe4,s -1-o k..~t. beek.. tu!~,1 .{.,.A ... ,. -n.~~,. 
CJ. 
- -
- defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of 
death." 428 U.S., at 303 ,. The opinion explained the importance 
of such individualzed consideration: 
"A process that accords no significance to relevant facets 
of the character and record of the individual offender or 
the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from 
consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death 
the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors 
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It 
treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not 
as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a 
faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the 
blind infliction of the penalty of death. 
" •••• [W]e believe that in capital cases the 
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth 
Amendment ••• requires consideration of the character 
and record of the individual offender and the circumstances 
of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensible 
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." 
428 U.S., at 304. Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 
- 325 (1976), held another mandatory death statute invalid for 
the same reason. See id., at 333-336. 
-
Finally, in Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977), 
the Court invalidated per curiam a statute imposing a mandatory 
death sentence on any person convicted of the first degree murder 
of a police officer in the performance of his lawful duties. The 
statute suffered from the same defects as those in Woodson and 
Stanislaus Roberts: 
"Circumstances such as the youth of the offender, the 
absence of any prior conviction, the influence of drugs, 
alcohol, or extreme emotional disturbance, and even the 
existence of circumstances which the offender reasonably 
believed provided a moral justification for his conduct 
are all examples of mitigating facts which might attend 
the killing of a peace officer and which are considered 
relevant in other jurisdictions. 
"As we emphasized repeatedly in Roberts and its 






the capital-sentencing decision allow for consideration 
of whatever mitigating circumstances may be relevant to 
either the particular offender of the particular offense." 
431 U.S., at 637. The Court also made a point of noting that 
the ''balding in Jur~k v. Texas ••• rested squarely on the 
fact that mitigating circumstances could be considered by the 






B. The Ohio statute. The Ohio statute provides for 
bifurcated proceedings on guilt and punishment, but of a slightly 
different kind than the statutes upheld in Gregg, Proffitt, or 
Jurek. In Ohio, only persons convicted of "aggravated murder" 
':} ~ ':, 2/ 
are eliy le for the death penalty.- If the prosecutor intends 
to seek the death penalty in an aggravated murder case, he 
must charge that one or more of seven specified "aggravating 
3/ 
circumstances" also attended the aggravated murder.- These 
charges of "aggravating circumstances" are called "specifications." 
If the case is tried to a jury, the jury returns a 
verdict both on guilt and on specifications. If the case is 
not tried to a jury, it is tried to a panel of three judges 
which makes findings on guilt and specifications. In either 
event, a defendant cannot be sentenced to death unless guilt 
and at least one specification are proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
2. Agftravated murder is defined, Ohio Rev. Code §2903.01: 
'(A). No person shall purposely, and with prior 
calculation and design, cause the death of another. 
I")._ . 
"(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another 
while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing 
immediately after committing or attempting to commit 
kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, aggravated 
robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape." 
3. Aggravating circumstances include, §2929.04(A), (1) that 
the offense was the assassination of specified office holders or 
candidates; (2) that the offense was committed for hire; (3) that 
the offense was committed to esca~ detection, apprehension, trial, 
or punishment for another offense committed by the offender; 
(4) that the offense was committed by a prisoner; (5) that the 
offender has previously been convicted of an offense of which the 
gist was the purposeful killing or attempt to kill another, 
committed prior to the offense at bar; or that the offense involved 





If guilt and at least one specification are found beyond 
a reasonable doubt, whether by a jury or by a panel of three 
judges, the next step is a mitigation hearing. If the case 
on guilt and specifications was tried to a jury, then the case 
on mitigation is tried to a single judge. If the case on guilt 
and specifications was tried to a three-judge panel, then the case 
on mitigation is tried to the same three judges. The inquiry 
at the mitigation hearing is channelled by the following 
statutory provision, which forms the heart of the instant 
case: 
"Regardless of whether one or more of the a ~gravating 
circumstances listed in division (A) of this section is 
specified in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded 
when, considering the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history, character, and condition of the offender, 
one or more of the following is established by a preponderance 
of the evidence: 
"(l) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated 
it. 
"(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been 
conn:nitted, but for the fact that the offender was under 
duress, coercion, or strong provocation. 
"(3~ The offense was primarily the product of the 
offenders psychosis or mental deficiency, though such 
condition is insufficient to establish the defense of 
insanity." 
the purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons; 
(6) that the victim was known to be a law enforcement officer, and 
either the victim was engaged in his duties at the time of the 
offense, or it was the offender's specific intent to kill a law 
enforcement officer; A~d (7) that the offense was coiinnitted while 
the offender was conn:nitting, attempting to conn:nit, or fleeing 
inn:nediately after conn:nitting or attempting to conn:nit kidnapping, 
rape, aggravated robbery, or aggravated kidnapping. 
13. 
- -
- Another statutory provision sets forth the procedure to 
be followed at the mitigation hearing: 
-
-
"(D) When death may be imposed as a penalty for 
aggravated murder, the court shall require a pre-sentence 
investigation and a psychiatric examination to be made, 
and reports submitted to the court ••• Copies of the 
reports shall be furnished to the prosecutor and to the 
offender or -his counsel. The court shall hear testimony 
and other evidence, the statement, if any, of the offender, 
and the arguments, if any, of counsel for the defense 
and prosecution, relevant to the penalty which should 
be imposed on the offender. If the offender chooses to 
make a statement, he is subject to cross-examination only 
if he consents to make such statement under oath or 
affirmation. 
"(E) Upon consideration of the reports, testimony, 
other evidence, statement of the offender, and arguments 
of counsel submitted to the court pursuant to division 
(D) of this section, if the court finds, or if the panel 
of three judges unanimously finds that none of the 
mitigating circumstances listed ••• is established by 
a preponderance of the evidence, it shall impose sentence 
of death on the offender. Otherwise, it shall impose sentence 





1. Petitioner. Petitioner contends that the three 
mitigating circumstances in the Ohio statute are so narrow and 
so rarely met as to make the statute virtually a mandatory 
death penalty statute. The statute is unconstitutional because 
it does not allow the sentencing authority to give independent 
significance to mitigating factors that this Court has found 
important in prior cases. 
The first mitigating circumsta nce - that "the victim 
induced or facilitated the offense" - hardly ever will be met. 
This is so because before the trial can • get to the mitigation 
stage, the jury or judge must have found the existence of an 
- aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt . Most of 
those aggravating circumstances (see note 3 supra) are of such 
a nature that their very existence will preclude the existence 
of this mitigating factor. 
-
The second mitigating circumstance - that it would be 
"unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for 
the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or 
strong provocation" - also is extremely unlikely to be met. 
Duress, coercion, and strong provocation all would constitute 
defenses to the offense itself, so that where they are present 
the trial rarely will even reach the mitigation stage. It is 
true that the Ohio Supreme Court, ·cecognizing this paradox, has 
suggested that these terms should be construed more generously 
in the mitigation section than they are in the context of 
IS-: 
- -
- defenses to charges. But that court has refused to give the 
terms real meaning, as shown by its holdings that persons who 
admittedly were under the domination of others were not 
entitled to the benefit of this mitigating circumstance because 
they failed to withdraw from that domination. 
-
The third mitigating circumstance - that the "offense 
was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental 
deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish 
the defense of insanity" - initially was construed exceedingly 
narrowly by the Ohio Supreme Court. "Mental deficiency" first 
was equated solely with extremely low intelligence. And the court 
even upheld the death sentences of persons who fit within this 
category. The court since has purported to broaden the factors 
that may bear on whether a person suffers from "mental deficiency" 
to include age and the influence of drugs. But in this very case 
it upheld the death sentence of a 16-year-old who smoked marijuana 
and took mescaline (a hallucir;enic) just two or three hours 
before the offense. Moreover, whatever the meaning of 
"psychosis or mental deficiency," this section requires that 
one of those conditions be the cause of the offense. It does 
not allow the sentencing authority to consider whether these 
factors, in and of themselves, might justify mitigation. 
The State will argue that its statute is valid under Gregg 
because it directs the sentencing authority, in deciding whether 
any of the three mitigating factors is present, to "consider[] 
- the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, 
'"' . 
- - I "l. 
- character, and condition of the offender." See page l'3 supra. 
-
-
The difficulty with this argument is that the Ohio statute 
allows the sentencing authority to consider these factors 
only in determining whether any of the three mitigating factors 
is present. Factors like a defendant's youth, lack of a serious 
prior criminal record, character, potential for rehabilitation, 
and the like are given no independent weight, and they have very 
little relevance to the three mitigating circumstances. 
For example, "One with a good character and no prior 
criminal record is not more likely, because of his character or 
record, to be susceptible to duress, coercion, or provocation 
than is one with a bad character and/or a poor record. Indeed, 
logic indicates the opposite to be true, in which case, the 
good character and absence of a criminal record would cost the 
offender his life." Brief for Petitioner 28. Likewise, the fact 
that a person has good character and no prior record has no 
apparent relevance to determining whether he is psychotic or 
mentally deficient - except that one might expect a psychotic 
to have a worse prior record than a normal person. In short, 
as one commentator has written: 
"[T]he sentencing authority is statutorily authorized to 
consider only the three mitigating circumstances spelled 
out in the statute. Other factors, such as the age or 
criminal record of the defendant are, in and of themselves, 
irrelevant to the sentencing decision.-ATEliough the Ohio 
Supreme Court has attempted to erode the exclusiveness of 
the three mitigating circumstances by saying that other 
fac~ors may '~ be considered, it is clear that they are considered 
o~ly insofar as they are relevant to the three statutory 
mitigating factors. Under Ohio law, while the sentencing 




sixteen years old in detennining whether or not he is 
mentally deficient, it cannot grant him mercy simply 
because he is sixteen years old, and, in the oriinion of 
the sentencing authority, ' too young to die.' ' 
Note, The Constitutionality of Ohio's Death Penalty, Ohio 
State L. Rev. (1977), Galley Proofs at 61. 
J,. The State. As petitioner predicts, the State does argue 
that its statute is valid under Gregg because it directs the 
sentencing authority, in deciding whether any of the three 
mitigating factors is present, to "consider[] the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and 
condition of the offender." For example, in this very case, 
the Ohio Supreme Court said, "that a defendant's age is a 
11. 
primary factor in detennining the existence of a mental deficiency. 
Senility, as well as minority, may well be relevant, and therefore 
properly considered, in detennining whether the offense was a 
product of mental deficiency." App. 142. 
However, in two surprising bursts of candor, the State 
agrees with petitioner that, "the Supreme Court of Ohio does 
not recognize the age of the offender, in and of itself, as 
being a mitigating factor"; and "concede[s] that if the age of 
the defendant without anything more is to be considered as a 
mitigating factor then the Ohio statute would fail." Brief for 
Respondent at 52, 55-56. 
The State misses the best argument it could make. The 
argument is that the relationship between the narrow mitigating 
- circumstances in the Ohio statute and the "nature and circumstances 
- -
- of the offense and the history, character, and condition of 
the offender," is very similar to the relationship between 
-
the second statutory question in Jurek v. Texas and the factors 
that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals said could be considered 
in relation to that question. In Jurek, the second statutory 
question required the jury to consider "whether there is a 
criwd~tll 
probability that the defendant would commitAacts of violence 
that would constitute a continuing threat to society." This 
Court upheld the statute because the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals had said that "[i]n considering the likelihood that the 
defendant would be a continuing threat t o society," the jury 
could consider a broad range of particularized factors about 
the defendant and his crime. See pages ~-~ supra. It could 
be argued that there, as here, the broad range of particularized 
factors could be considered only as they bear on the statutory 
question, and not as mitigating factors in their own right. The 
State should argue that if the statute in Jurek was not invalid 
for this reason, then neither is the Ohio statute. 
Amicus ACLU of Ohio, anticipating this argument, contends 
that the Texas and Ohio statutes are distinguishable because 
"[t]he very ambiguity of [Texas'] second statutory question allows 
for 'play in the joints,' ••• as a result of which the Texas 
mitigation hearing is a wide-open inquiry into justness of 
punishment or whether the defendant is rehabilitable based on 
all the facts of the case." Brief for Amicus ACLU of Ohio 
- 35 n.11. Ohio's mitigating factors, on the other hand, themselves 
'''-
- -
- are narrow, and they have been further narrowed by the Ohio 
Supreme Court's construction and application of them. One 
commentator has made a similar argument: 
-
-
"[T]he inquiry conducted by the jury [in Texas] in 
answering the second question appears to be considerably 
broader than the inquiry permitted by the three mitigating 
circumstances in the Ohio statute. Whether a defendant 
will engage in criminal acts in the future is an 
inquiry relevant in practical terms to all defendants 
convicted of capital crimes. It involves a consideration 
of a number of factors relating to both the nature of 
the offense and the offender, factors which can have 
a cumulative effect and can be weighed and judged in 
relation to one another. 
"By contrast, the three mitigating circumstances 
included in the Ohio statutes, because of their natures 
or their narrow interpretati ons, cannot or are not likely 
to lead to meaningful mitigation inquiries in all or 
even most capital cases. The Ohio statutes do not 
authorize a broad inquiry into the overall character of 
the offender or his offense. While a number of factors 
may be considered in determining whether a defendant is, 
for instance, mentally deficient, the ultimate inquiry is 
still quite narrow." 
Note, supra, Galley Proofs at 62. The same commentator also 
argues that under the Texas statute, the broad range of factors 
bearing on the probability of the defendant's committing future 
acts of violence can be weighed against one another and considered 
cumulatively; but under the Ohio statute, no such factors carry 
any weight at all unless enough of them exist to prove •~~of the 





D. Discussion. I find this case very troublesome. My 
three main problems are that the Ohio statute is difficult to 
distinguish from the Texas statute upheld in Jurek; that the 
Ohio Supreme Court has, in my view, applied its "mitigating 
circumstances" in an exceedingly narrow fashion, even as it 
says that it interprets them broadly; and that it is unclear 
from this Court's prior cases whether the Constitution requires 
that the sentencing authority take any particular mitigating 
circumstances - such as age and prior criminal record - into 
account in capital sentencing. Here I discuss each problem in 
turn. 
1. Distinguishing Jurek. The main W~~~,s ltlP petitioner's 
arguments is the difficulty in distinguishing the Ohio statute 
from the Texas statute that was upheld in Jurek. I have the 
strong impression that the joint opinion in Jurek envisioned 
that Texas juries would consider a broad range of factors like ----~---~ 
age, prior criminal record, and the like as considerations that 
in themselves weigh in favor of mitigation; but the fact remains 
that under the Texas statute such factors supposedly are relevant 
only insofar as they bear on the statutory question of "whether 
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to 
society." The parallel between the Texas and Ohio statutes is 
unmistakable in this respect. 
I believe, however, that the Texas statute can fairly be 







underlying statutory question of the Texas statute, by its 
nature, always requires the sentencing authority to take into 
account a broader range of particularized factors than the 
three statutory questions in the Ohio statute. To predict 
whether a person is likely to conmit criminal acts of violence 
in the future, I would argue, requires one to know as much as 
possible about a person - his character, his prior criminal 
record, his susceptibility to influence, his youth, the nature 
of the crime for which he is on trial, and the like. I think 
the perception of the joint opinion in Jurek was the same: 
"[The Texas court has] indicated that it will interpret 
this second question so as to allow a defendant to bring 
to the jury's attention whate.x.,er mitigating circumstances 
he may be able to show • • • • ' (428 U .s., at 272) 
\ 
"What is essential is that the jury have before it all 
possible relevant information about the individual 
defendant whose fate it must determine. Texas law clearly 
assures that all such evidence will be adduced." (428 
U.S., at 276) 
decide 
But under the Ohio statute, to / whether the victim 
facilitated the offense, or whether the defendant acted under 
duress or coercion, or because of a psychosis or mental deficiency, 
the sentencing authority does not need to consider such a broad 
range of factors. The statutory mitigating circumstances all 
focus on factors that affected the defendant at the time of the - - ------
crime; they have little or nothing to do with his personal 
history. It is true that under the Ohio statute the defendant 
to 
may bring/the attention of the sentencing authority a broad 




Texas statute - this infonnation rarely will be relevant to 
the statutory questions, and therefore rarely will carry any 
real weight in the sentencing decision. 
In short, I believe that the Ohio statute could fairly 
be distinguished from the Texas statute - but only with some 
~,,,,_., -difficulty. 
2. The Ohio Supreme Court's construction and application of 
its statute. A great deal of my problem with the State's arguments 
derives from the performance of the Ohio Supreme Court 
in construing and applying its death penalty statute. I have 
\ read each of the 25 cases in which the Ohio Supreme Court has 
4 ' ~ ----
considered appeals from death sentences. That court has affinned 
- conviction and sentence in 24 of these cases, and in the 25th 
-
it reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial because 
the defendant was denied certain discovery materials. State v. 
James Lockett, 49 Ohio St.2d 71, 358 N. E.2d 1077 (1976). That 
court's construction of the mitigating circumstances has been 
noteworthy for the amount of backing and filling it has done 
after initially narrow constructions; and for what seems to me 
to be a marked divergence between the generosity with which the 
court says it now is construing the mitigating circumstances, and 
the refusal to reverse death sentences in a number of cases that 
arguably fall within those criteria. Among my observations: 
(a) Petitioner is correct in claiming that under the Ohio 
statute as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court, factors other 
than the three statutory mitigating circumstances carry no weight 
)-3. 
- -
- unless they are relevant to the statutory circumstances. That 
this is so is demonstrated by two cases. 
-
-
State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 74 (1976), was the first 
case in which the Ohio Supreme Court considered its new statute. 
The court considered whether the statutory mitigating circumstances 
were broad enough to afford the particularized consideration 
required by Gregg, and decided that they were: 
"The Genera l Assembly might properly have included 
other mitigating circumstances (see Proffitt v. Florida, 
••• ), or declined to list specific mitigating circumstances 
(see Gregg v. Georgia, ••• ), but we conclude that those 
which are listed do direct inquiry both to the circumstances 
of the crime and to the individual culpability of the 
defendant, and so adequately guide the decision of the 
sentencing authority. It is a delicate legislative task 
to provide standards which are not arbitrary, yet which 
allow meaningful consideration of the defendant and his 
crime •••• We perceive no distinction of constitutional 
dimensions between Ohio's mitigating factors, • •• and 
those upheld in Proffitt v. Florida ••• " 
48 Ohio St.2d, at 86-87. In a footnote to the last statement, 
the court added, "The major differences are that the Florida 
statute permits consideration of the age and prior criminal 
record of the defendant, of more broadly defined mental and 
emotional disturbances and impairments, and of the fact that 
the defendant was an accomplice with only a minor role in the 
crime." 48 Ohio St.2d, at 87 n.2. 
In June of last year the court again considered an argument 
that the statutory mitigating circumstances are too narrow, 
and rejected it summarily: 
"[A]ppellant contends that the Ohio statutory scheme 
places unconstitutional limitations upon the consideration 
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"'lJ . .;--,,~ .. "'1 ~. ~~ ,LdL r~ .., '-'7 ~-, .... ..------ ~-, 
of the defendant do not constitute separate mitigating ~ 
circumstances, but are consid.~.ed o~j.n te::ons of ~> 
establishing duress, coercion, strong provocation, psychosis "'-
or mental deficiency, all of which focus the trial judge's 
attention on the defendant's condition or state of m! nd _ 1 __ at the time of the offense. ~
"In State v. Bayless, • • • this court, finding that lA H 
Ohio's mitigating factors were 'basically reasonable and"f '"""'{ 
similar' to those approved in Proffitt v. Florida, • • -~ 
upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's scheme for 
establishing mitigating circumstances, and further 
discussion on this issue is not merited." ~ 
State v. Weind, 364 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ohio 1977) . Thus, the Ohio 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that one premise of petitioner's 
rgument - that the "nature and circumstances of the offense -and the history, character, and condition of the offender" may l 
be considered only insofar as they relate to the~ree stat~ ry 
mitigating factors - is correct. 
(b) The Ohio Supreme Court's construction and application 
of the statutory mitigating circumstances has been shifting and 
unpredictable. As an example, consider the path of its construction 
of the term "mental deficiency": 
The court first construed the term "mental defic'iency" in 
State v. Bayless, supra, to mean a "low or defective state of 
intelligence" or "mental retardation." In rejecting the appellant's 
argument that the term also should encompass emotional or 
behavioral abnormalities, the court said: 
"[A] court may not, in the guise of construction, disregard 
the ordinary and accepted meaning of a term. Mental 
deficiency is consistently defined to mean a low or 
defective state of intelligence. Construing the term broadly, 
a deficiency may be severe or mild, and may be hereditary 
or caused by a brain defect, disease, or injury, or by 





it does not include the emotional and behavioral 
abnormalities claimed to exist by the defendant. Because 
no mental deficiency has been shown in this case, we do 
not, of course, reach the question of the evidence which 
would justify a finding that an existing mental 
deficiency was a primary cause of an offense." (48 Ohio 
St.2d, at 96) 
In a case decided just one month after Bayl ess, however, 
the court backed away from this definition, and it went so far 
as to say that the term "mental deficiency" should not be 
defined at all[!]: 
"It is clear that the General Ass8mbly chose the 
[terms 'psychosis ' and 'mental deficiency'] to allow the 
trial judge or panel the broadest possible latitute 
in the .examination of the defendant I s mental state 
and mental capacity for the purpose of the mitigation 
inquiry ••• Thus, broadly defined and however evidenced, 
any mental state or incapacity may be considered in light 
of all the circumstances and including the nature of the 
crime itself so that it may be determined whether the 
condition found to have existed was the primary producing 
cause of the offense. To define terms such as those used 
in the statute is to narrow them." 
State v. Black, 48 Ohio St.2d 262, 268 (1976). The court did not 
bother to cite its prior inconsistent construction in Bayless. 
As another example, I think that the court has given with 
one hand and taken away with the other in its construction of the 
terms "duress" and "coercion." In State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St.2d 
127 (1976), the court acknowledged that, ••.to have any effective 
meaning, the terms 'duress' or 'coercion' ••• must be construed, 
if possible, more broadly than when used as a defense in a 
criminal case." 48 Ohio St.2d, at 135. The court continued: 
"The essential characteristic of coercion which 
emerges from [civil law cases] is that force, threat of 





necessitous circumstances, or some combination of those, 
has overcome the mind or volition of the defendant so 
that he acted other than he ordinarily would have acted 
in the absence of those influences. 
"This definition appropriately allows consideration of 
the broad range of information relevant to mitigation 
set out in [ t he statute], including 'the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, and the h i story, character, 
and condition of the offender.' It also corresponds, as 
well as perhaps any definition, to the essential purpose 
of any hearing upon mitigation •••• [T]he purpose of 
mitigation is to recognize that the punishment assigned 
for a criminal act may, for ethical and humanitarian 
reasons, be tempered out of consideration of the individual 
offender and his crime." (48 Ohio St.2d, at 137) 
In applying this seemingly generous definition , however, 
I think that the court has been something less than generous. 
For example, in Woods itself, the court acknowledged that 
"the evidence establishes a consistent portrai t of Woods 
as a young man with no previous criminal record but one 
who was easily led and who came under the influence of 
Reaves [the other participant in the offense]. It appears 
likely that it was the influence of Reaves which persuaded 
Woods to agree to participate in a ~obbery , to acquiese 
and cooperate in the purchase of a gun, and to remain at 
the scene of the attempted robbery despite his reluctance. 
All of these are factors which favor the granting of 
mitigation." 
137-
48 Ohio St.2d, at/138. The court nevertheless affirmed Woods' 
death sentence for shooting a policeman who apprehended him and 
Reaves in the course of a r obbery ll>ecause "when the opportunity 
to abandon the robbery, to surrender to the police, to flee , or 
even to refrain from the firing, was presented, Woods nevertheless 
opened fire ••• " Id., at 138. Thus, Woods was not acting under 
"duress or coercion" at the moment he acted. 
Likewise, in State v. Weind, 364 N.E.2d 224 (1976), the 
court affirmed the death sentence of a defendant who "was easily 
- led because he felt a need to belong, and [who] was non-violent in 
). 'I. 
- fit- ~ ~ 2 i. 
~~~~-~ 
- nature." Although this evidence suggested "that the cfe!edant 
-
may have acted under a strong domination or persuasion," it was 
"outweighed by other evidence • • • which suggests that his 
acts were voluntary" - such as the fact that he did not withdraw 
from the plan to abduct and kill the estranged hu sband of a friend's 
mother when he had the chance. And, as I will discuss in Part II, 
the petitioner in this case was thought to be easily led by 
his companion in crime, bu t the Ohio court decided the 
influence did not rise to the level of "domination." 
(c) I also note that a defendant's youth has not yet tipped 
the balance in favor of life in any case before the Ohio Supreme 
Court, despite the fact that it has heard at least three cases 
,---
in which the defendant was under 18 years of age at the time 
of the offense . State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St.2d 270 (1976) 
(defendant 16 years 10 months old at time of offense); State v. 
Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 (1976)(defendant 17 years 9 months old 
at time of offense); State v. Bayless, supra (age not specified in 
opinion, but defendant was first charged "with being a delinquent" 
when arrested). 
~'( 1( -i( -i( * -;'( -;'( ~·( 
It is my view that the statutes in Gregg and Jurek were 
upheld in part because the authors of the joint opinionsi elt 
appellate { 
confident the state/courts involved would give fair consideration 
to the mitigating factors in each defendant's case. It also is 
my view that the Ohio Supreme Court has not earned the same kind 
- · of confidence. Although it is quite unlikely that this Court ever 
-
- -
could advert to such a consideration in an opinion, I think that 
this consideration might properly be taken into account in this 
"" ~, ;+v case. My quarrel is not with the / f of judicial writing in 
Ohio, but rather with the nature of the results of review. I 
would feel considerably better about this case if the Ohio court 
just once had reversed a death sentence, and I think it has had 
a number of fair chances to do just that. 
3. The problem whether the Constitution requires any 
particular mitigating circumstances to be considered. One 
other problem with this case is that petitioner's argument seems 
to imply that the State must take particular mitigating 
circumstances into account. I cannot tell from this Court's 
- prior cases, however, whether the Constitution requires that 
any particular mitigating circumstances must be considered; or 
whether, on the other hand, the State is free to choose any 
mitigating circumstances that i T wishes, so long as it chooses 
some (e.g . , does not have a mandatory statute). There are 
statements in the cases looking both ways. This statement in 
,-CJ. 
Gregg seems to imply that the choice is the State ' s: " [T]he ~1 
problem [of unguided discretion] will be alleviated if the jury 
-
the 
is given guidance regarding the factors about/crime and the 
defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems 
particularly relevant to the sentencing decision." 428 U .s., 
at 192(emph. added). But statements in Jurek and Harry Woods 





to consider " ·on the basis of all relevant evidence not only 
why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should 
(emph. added) 
not be imposed." Jurek, 428 U.S., at 271A see Harry Roberts, 
431 U.S., at 637. 
Although I simply cannot tell from the Court's prior cases 
whether any particular mitigating circumstances must be taken 
into account, I do note that four cases - Gregg~ Proffitt, Jurek, 
and Harry Roberts - have listed factors that either were, or 
should have been, taken into account in those cases. Three 
particular factors were mentioned in each of the four cases: 
(1) Age (youth) of the offender. 
(2) Extent and nature of prior criminal record, or 
absence of one. 
(3) Whether the defendant was under emotional or mental 
disturbance at the time of the offense. 
It will be noted that neither of the first two of these factors 
30 . 
is an independent mitigating circumstance under the Ohio statute, 
and I doubt whether the third would qualify by itself as "psychosis 
or mental deficiency." In addition, the following factors were 
mentioned in one or more of these four cases: 
to 
(4) The victim consented/or participated in the offense 
(Proffitt). 
(5) The defendant was under duress or the domination of 
another at the time of the offense (Proffitt, Jurek). 
(6) The defendant was an accomplice, and his participation 
was relatively minor (Proffitt). 
(7) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law, was substantially diminished 
at the time of the offense (Proffitt, Harry Roberts 
["influence of drugs or alcohol"]). 
-
- -
(8) Extent of the defendant's cooperation with the 
police (Gregg). 
(9) The existence of circumstances that the defendant 
reasonably believed provided moral justification for 
the act (Harry Roberts). 
In the instant case, petitioner could, and in effect does, 
argue that Ohio's statute is bad because under it, unlike under 
the statutes upheld in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek, the factors 
of age and of prior criminal record do not count in mitigation. 
My own belief is that any statutory scheme under which a 
defendant's youth and his lack of a criminal record do not count 
in his favor is exceedingly harsh. On the other hand, it would 
be a risky business for the Court to begin listing factors that ·t co~ stitutional: y must be weighed in the defendant's favor. One 
• 1/ would expect an endless stream of defendants claiming that 
factors or circumstances peculiar to them should have been, but 
were not, weighed in their favor. The Court could have a difficult 
time deciding which of these factors the Constitution does and 
does not require to be considered. 
One alternative to picking which factors must be taken into 
account would be to hold that any mitigating factors that the 
defendant can raise must be considered. This is essentially the 
situation under the statute upheld in Gregg, which did not 
enumerate any statutory mitigating circumstances; and in Jurek, 
where a broad inquiry was read into the second statutory question. 
the statute in 
The problem with this approach would be that/Proffitt did 
enumerate a limited number of specified mitigating f actors that 
- must be considered, so that the Court may be foreclosed from saying 
11. 
- -
- that the sentencing authority must consider all mitigating 
factors that the defendant can muster. 
-
-
4. Conclusion. Despite the difficulties, I would hold that 
the Ohio statute as applied does not permit consideration of 
a wide enough range of factors in mitigation. At the least, 
I think that the youth and prior record of the defendant 
should be taken into account in every case. I also would 
urge, as elaborated in the next Part, that Bell should have 







II. BELL AND THE OFFENSE. ------
~ 
A. The offense. The evidence showed that Bell and Hall, an 
~ -year-old with whom Bell apparently was acquainted, met at a 
i"" Ci "'-C.'"',.._ofi 
neighborhood "Connnunity Center' '). on the day of the offense. They 
left the Center to go riding in a Pont iac belonging to Hall's 
brother. There may have been a conversation about obtaining 
a car of their own to drive. See App. 53 (presentence report). 
Whhle riding in the Pontiac, Hall and Bell began following 
a blue 1974 Chevrolet. Hall, who was driving, followed the 
Chevrolet into the parking garage to an apartment building. When 
the Chevrolet was parked on the second level of the garage, Hall 
got out of the Pontiac and accosted the Chevrolet's driver, 
64-year-old Julius Graber, with a 20-guage sawed-off shotgun. 
Hall forced Graber into the trunk of the Chevrolet and drove 
33 . 
that car out of the garage, while Bell followed driving the Pontiac. 
Bell parked the Pontiac near Hall's home, and he and Hall 
drove in the Chevrolet to a cemetary. Bell, who was driving the 
Chevrolet at this point, backed the car about 100 feet down a lane 
in the cemetary. 
What happened next is the subject of some uncertainty. The 
(
only source of reliable information is the resident of an apartment 
b~ ng near the cemetary who was sitting i ; his ;;r i n the : partment 
building's parking lot listening to the end of a World Series game. 




"Pierce observed a vehicle stopped in the cemetary 
with its parking lights on. He heard two doors close, one 
after the other, turned his radio down to listen, and then 
heard a voice plead ''Don't shoot me. Don't shoot me.' 
Pierce turned his radio off, and shortly thereafter heard 
one shot, followed, after an interval, by a second shot. 
He then saw the interior light of the car go on, and a 
man enter the parked car on the passenger side and move 
behind the wheel. Pierce heard two car doors close, saw 
the interior light go off, and then watched the car leave 
the cemetary, without any lights." 
at about 11 p.m., and they 
App. 132. Pierce called police/ · , arrived shortly to find 
Graber lying face down in the cemetary. An ambulance was 
summoned, but Graber was pronounced dead on arrival at the 
hospital. "A post-mortem examination revealed that death had 
resulted from a wound at the rear of the head delivered by a 
shorgun held at near-contact range. Numerous pellets of #5 
- shot were removed from the body, and testimony was received 
that the wounds, to the hand and head, were consistent with the 
fatal shot having been delivered while Graber's g ands were clasped 
_...........,.. ~ :ws 
3 '1. 
behind his head." App. 146 (Ohio Ct.App. opinion). Graber's wallet 
~
was missing, but hospital attendants found that he had hidden 
money and other valuables in his shoes. 
Hall and Bell drove the Chevrolet to Dayton, where they spent 
the night in the car. The next morning, with Bell driving, they 
stopped at a service station to ask about finding work. They left 
the service station but returned again shortly. Hall, brandishing 
a shotgun, forced the station's attendent to give him the keys to 
the attendant's car. Hall made the attendant climb in the trunk 
of the car and drove it from the station, with Bell following in 
- the Chevrolet. 
-
-
Hall was stopped by a Highway Patrolman for having a faulty 
muffler. During the stop the attendant attracted the patrolman's 
attention by pounding on the inside of the trunk. The attendant 
w~s 
was released, Hall was arrested, and the shotgunLrecovered from 
the attendant 's car. This shotgun was shown at trial to be the 
weapon used to kill Graber. 
Bell saw the patrolman stop Hall and proceeded to drive on 
past. He drove to Cincinnati, abandoned the Chevrolet, and went 
to his home. About a week later police, apparently acting on 
information from Hall and from their own investigation, appeared 
at Bell's home and took him to police headquarters. Bell's 
mother was invited to attend the questioning, but she declined 
- police offers to transport her to the police station to be with 
her son. 
-
Bell gave a recorded statement to police which was admitted 
into evidence at his trial. The Ohio Supreme Court described 
the statement as follows: _____,._ 
"Bell conceded his presence during the kidnapping of 
Graber, but claimed he was not aware of the shotgun until 
Hall got out of the Pontiac in the parking garage to 
threaten Graber with it. Bell conceded driving Graber' s 
car to the cemetary and backing int o the cemetary lane, 
but insisted that it was Hall who removed Graber from the 
trunk, and that it was Hall who took Graber into the bushes. 
Bell said he then heard a shot and Graber pleading for his 
life. After the first shot, according to Bell's recorded 
statement, Hall ran back to the vehicle to get another 
shotgun shell and then returned to the bushes, whereupon 
Bell heard the second shot." 
App. 133. · The Ohio Court of Appeals and Supreme Court thought -the trier of fact was enti~led to disbelieve Bell's story that he 
35": 
- - 3G,. 
- stayed in the car while Hall took Graber out of the trunk and 
-
/
shot him. First, Pierce had heard two car doors open before the 
shots, and heard two close after the shots. This suggests that 
both men got out of the car. Second, one hardly could expect 
IA.JI" ( that 
f Hall 
Graber would lie quietly with his .hands behind his head while 
returned to the car for a second shotgun shell. Bruises found 
on Graber's body were consistent with the State's theory that 
one man held Graber down while the other got the second shotgun z;r--
shell .-- Bell and Hall were charged with two counts of aggravated 
murder . The first count charged that they purposely killed 
Graber in the course of an aggravated robbery, and the second count 
charged that they killed Graber in the course of a kidnapping. 
App. 5. As I read these counts, they charged that Bell and Hall 
committed the Ohio version of felony-murder, see note 2 supra, 
although they also might be meant to charge premeditated murder . 
The specification to the first count charged that the offense was 
committed in the course of an armed robbery, and the specification 
to the second count charged that the offense was committed in 
the course of a kidnapping. App. 6-7. 
Bell pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. 
-
4 . To which petitioner replies: "First, Petitioner never 
maintained in his statement that he remained inside the auto - only 
that he did not accompany Hall and Mr. Graber on their fatal walk 
up the service drive into the dark woods . Secondly, the fact that 
Pierce heard two doors is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
theory that Petitioner remained in the auto, as the trunk of the 
auto would have made similar noises as it opened and closed. What 
Pi erce heard could have been one door and the trunk , as opposed to 
two doors ••• • Further , the coroner could not identify a source 
fnote continued next page] 
-
- - 1~. 
After being found competent to stand trial, Bell waived the 
right to jury trial. The three-judge panel to which he was tried 
found him guilty of aggravated murder under the second count of 
the indictment and of the specification to that count. App. 16-17. 
After the mitigation hearing, the evidence from which is recounted 
below, the three judges agreed that no mitigating circumstance 
was shown by a preponderance, and sentenced Bell to death. 
B. Willie Lee Bell. We have a fair amount of information 
about Willie Lee Bell,. The Appendix includes both pretrial 
and posttrial reports by a team of three psychiatrists; a 
pre-sentence report by the probation department; and testimony from 
the mitigation hearing. The picture that emerges is predictably 
- sad. 
-
Bell was 16 years 10 months old at the time of the offense. 
He was born and raised in Cincinnati, except for a period of 
1 1/2 years when he lived with a grandfather in Philadelphia. 
There are indications that Bell was subject to better discipline, 
and showed better behavior, when he lived with his grandfather. 
App. 55, 59 (probation department report). 
Bell is the middle of five children. His father is an 
alcoholic cab driver who was on probat ion for failure to provide 
or causes of the bruises which appeared on Mr. Graber's body. It 
would seem as reasonable that the bruises were inflicted while the 
victim was being jostled around in the trunk of the auto, and 
especially while it proceeded up the rocky service drive." Brief 
for Petitioner 39. 
- -
9 for the family from 1962 to 1968; after 1968, he left the family 
to fend for themselves. Bell's mother was a waitress or maid 
until she sustained a back injur y for which she now receives 
disability payments. Bell's older sisters, aged 19 and 23, both 
are on ADC and both are on probation for bad check charges. His 
younger brothers also are said to be "known to the Juvenile Court!' 
-
App. 56 (probation department report). 
Bell's performance in school has been marginal. He repeated 
third grade, although when he lived in Philadelphia with his 
grandfather "he achieved in more adequate fashio.n," App. 54, 
in the sixth and seventh grades. He returned to Cincinnati for 
eighth grade and was expelled from schooi for disciplinary reasons 
in the ninth grade. He returned to a school for emotionally 
unstable children, the McMillan Center, and completed the tenth -------------
3$'. 
grade with poor to ~air grades. Bell apparently is an underachiever, 
-;> 
~ 
though. His pretrial psychiatric exam shows an IQ in the vicinity 
o~ 0, App. 39-40, and the posttrial eJffi!ILDe gg~d his f;Q at ~~ 
120, App. 44. This improvement in scores was attributed by one of -the examining doctors to a better diet, more regular living routine, 
and freedom from drugs during the time that Bell was in jail during 
and after his trial. App. 104-105 (mitigation hearing). 
Bell's history in the three years before the offense is not 
good. He claims that he smoked marii uana every day during those 
App. 74-77 • 
three years, and often took LSD and mescaline./ His teachers at .... -the McMillan Center were of the opinion that he was under the 
- influence of drugs all the time. App. 84, 87, 91 (mitigation 
- - :SC,. 
- hearing). Bell says that he was under the influence of marijuana 
and mescaline on the day of the offense, but the courts below 
discounted this factor because he was able to drive a car from 
-
-
Cincinnati to Dayton on that day. ~~ -
as ..MA-/-~ During the same three years, Bell's court record was 











Riding in stolen 
car 
Robbery 
Disposition(all in juvenile court) 
$25 fine & costs; adjudicated 
delinquent 
30 days house arrest; placed on 
probation 
$25 fine & costs; work detail 
for five Saturdays 
Violation of court Dismissed 
order 





$10 fine & costs; restored to 
probation 
$10 & court costs; license 
suspended for six months 
 
Bell has held down jobs as a vendor at Cincinnati's Riverfront 
Stadium and, allegedly, at a bowling alley and motel.
1 
App. 57. / 
He has been active sexually, claiming to have fathered a child. \))p-e..J • 
App. 57. He is the best or second-best chess player in the county 
jail, App. 44, and, "He is quite talented musically and relates -that he can play nearly all instruments by ear which has been 
confirmed by members of his family. He particularly enjoys playing 
the piano and it is indicated that he is quite accomplished on 





Bell consistently has denied knowing that Hall was going 
to kill Graber or intending to be part of a killing. He says 
that he went along with Hall's actions because he became 
frightened when Hall pulled the shotgun at Graber's garage and 
because he was high and not thinking straight at the time. The 
post-trial psychiatric report, however, concluded that Bell was 
not acting from duress or from mental deficiency at the time 
of the offense: 
"[Bell] feels that he was not responsible because he was 
'f-0. 
not physically present and did not fire the weapon. He 
cannot understand why he should be implicated merely because 
he was with [Hall] and does not understand this particular 
aspect of the law. Nonetheless, he seems to have better 
than average intelligence, adequate judgement, and 
knows [sic; "no"?] significant mental pathology which would 
have caused him to nave participated in this activity without 
full and conscious consent. The examiners thus are lead 
J 
to conclude that none of the [statutory mitigating] 
circumstances ••• are present as far as this offense 
is concerned.'·' (App. 45) 
C. The Ohio Supreme Court's view of the mitigating factors 
in Bell's case. The Ohio Supreme Court found that there was no 
evidence to suggest the first mitigating circumstance, victim 
participation, was present. It rejected the claim that coercion 
or duress had been shown as follows: 
"There was evidence in the psychiatric reports that 
appellant was ferhaps easily led by Hall. When combined 
with appellant s age, it is conceivable that all characteristi c.s 
could establish [duress or coercion]. However, we believe 
the panel was justified and correct in finding that this 
mitigating circumstance was not established by the evidenca 
Even if it were believed that appellant was apprehensive 
of Hall and was 'forced' to go along with the crimes, the 
hard fact remains that appellant could very easily have quit 
the scheme while following in another car. Further, it must 





same type of scheme the very next day when Hall was 
arrested." 
APJ?.• 142. It likewise rejected the argument that "mental 
deficiency" had been shown: 
"While rejecting appellant's claim that a minor defendant 
is~ se 'mentally deficient,' we do hold that a 
defenciant's age is a primary factor in determining the 
existence of a mental deficiency. Senility, as well as 
minority, may be relevant, and therefore properly considered, 
in determining whether the offense was a product of mental 
deficiency. 
"The sum of the evidence and testimony of the 
psychiatrists, psychologists, probation department, school 
authorities and others fails to sustain appellant's 
position that he suffered from a mental deficiency. 
Appellant's s ituation was unpleasant but not unfamiliar: 
An unsatisfactory home, absence of family or other 
supervision, drug involvement, and inability to cope with 
school demands. Even when considered together with defendant ' s 
minority , all the factors do not establish a 'mental 
deficiencz1for the purposes of [the statute]. Although 
appellants environment was indeed undesirable, such 
conditions do not excuse or even mitigate aggravated murder. 
To hold otherwise would set a dangerous and misleading 
precedent for future defendants." 
App. 142-143. 
D. Corrnnents. I think it would be tragic to execute Willie 
Lee Bell. My impression from the various reports in the record 
is that he is a talented young man who has fair potential for 
rehabilitation . It is impossible to know whether he went down 
the cemetary path with Hall, but I doubt whether he pulled the 
trigger . Although Bell does not have a good prior record, I 
think that he would have had a considerably better chance at 
sentencing if the sentencing authority could have considered his 
youth as a factor that in itself mitigates against a death 






sentence. I, for one, would not have the stomach to sentence 
a defendant who was sixteen years old at the time of the 
offense to death on this set of facts. 
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January 19, 1978 
No. 76-6513 Bell v. Ohio 
No. 76-6997 Lockett v. Ohio 
~ 
I dictate this summary memorandum of my tentative 
views in preparation for tomorrow's Conference: 
We took these cases to consider whether the Ohio 
statute, as construed, allows the sentencing court 
sufficient authority to consider all relevant mitigating 
factors. 
The Ohio statute, unique among those we have 
considered, specifies only three categories of mitigating 
c i rcumstances, those arguably re l evant to these two cases 
being limited to "duress", and "psychos i s or mental 
deficiency". The statute is structured in a cur i ous way. 
It provides that the sentencing authority may consider "the 
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, 
character, and condition of the offender" but only if these 
ci r cumstances establish by a preponde r ance of the evidence 
that the offense was comm i tted under duress or was the 
product of the defendant's "phycosis or mental 
deficiency". 
In the Oh i o Supreme Court's opinion in Bell (48 





"Syllabus 2. Relevant factors such as the age of 
the defendant and prior criminal record are among 
those to be considered by the trial judge or 
three-judge panel in determining whether the 
existence of a mitigating circumstance pursuant 
to R.C. 2929. 04 (B) (2) and (3) was established by 
a preponderance of the evidence, State v. Bell, 
48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E. 2d 556 (1976)-.-(Br. 
23) • 
The foregoing makes clear that age and prior 
criminal record may be considered (in these cases) only "in 
determining whether the offense was committed under duress, 
or whether the offense was the product of defendant's 
'psychosis or mental deficiency'". 
And in State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, at 96, 
"mental deficiency" is defined solely in terms of a 
"defective state of intelligence" or "subnormal 
intelligence (i.e., in terms of one's I.Q.)". 
Despite the foregoing, there are a number of 
statements in opinions of the Ohio court to the effectthat 
the mitigat i ng factor language should be construed broadly. 
If the statutory language did not determine "life 
or death" for the defendant, perhaps we could tolerate the 
ambiguity of the statutory language as construed. But 
where the death sentence is at issue, I cannot conclude 
that the sentencing court was required to focus on all 
relevant mitigating circumstances. 
In Bell, this would include primarily the 




youth, his addiction to drugs, and the possibility of 
rehabilitation due to the fact that his intelligence 
actually was relatively high. Moreover, there was no 
finding that he was the "trigger man", though he certainly 
was heavily implicated in the murder. 
In Lockett, it is even less clear that the 
sentencing authority was required to consider the 
circumstances under which the offense was committed, 
including the relatively secondary role she played in a 
murder she probable did not foresee. 
3. 
In each of our prior cases, Gregg, Proffitt, 
Jurek and Harry Roberts, we mentioned as possible 
mitigating factors (i) age, (ii) extent and nature of prior 
criminal record, and (iii) emotional or mental 
disturbance. In Proffitt we also specifically mentioned 
the degree of participation in the offense. 
If, as I am disposed to vote, the Court concludes 
that these two cases must be reversed, the more troublesome 
question for me is the proper disposition. We could simply 
hold, I suppose, that the mitigating factors relied upon by 
these two defendants could not have been considered 
adequately under the Ohio statute, and order that the death 
sentences be set aside. The advantage of a limited holding 
is that the entire statute would not be invalidated, with 




statute would be set aside. The statute is facially va l id 
with respect to a defendant who, for example, can advance 
no mitigating circumstances at all: ~.g., an adult, sane, 
murderer for hire. 
The alternative to working out a "narrow" decision 
{which I suspect would be difficult), is simply to 
i nvalidate the Ohio statute for its fa i lure adequately to 
require consideration of all relevant mitigating 
circumstances. I will not join any per se rule either as 
to age or accomplices {"non t r igger persons"). None of our 
cases has suggested a per se rule. Rather, although our 
language has varied, they can be read as supporting the 
appropriateness - indeed constitutional necessity - of at 
least affording the clear opportunity to the sentencing 
authority to consider all relevant mitigating factors. 
I attach to this memorandum a brief summary of the 
relevant portions of the statutes in Gregg, Proffitt and 
Jurek. Although Jurek is far from being a model, the Texas 






Georgia statute (Gregg) 
Bifurcated. 
Ten specified aggravating ci r cumstances. 
Sentencing judge or jury directed to "consider any 
mitigating circumstances" - without i dentifying any 
particular ones. 
In Gregg we said the statute requires the jury or 
jury "to consider the circumstances of the crime and the 
er iminal before it recommends a sentence". (Specifically 
mentioned "youth of accused". 428 U.S. 197.) 
Florida statute (Proffitt) 
Bifurcated. 
Both aggravating and mitigating circumstances are 
specified in statute. 
The specified mitigating ones include: (a) prior 
record, (b) mental or emotional disturbance, (c) accompl ice 
and participation in crime a relatively minor, (d) age 
(and several others). 
Note: Under this statute Lockett may wel l have 
been spared the death sentence. 
Texas statute (Jurek) 
Bifurcated. 
Does not specify either agg r avating or mitigating 





to (1) intent of defendant and circumstances of crime, (2) 
probability of future criminal conduct, and (3) presence of 
provocation. 
Death sentence could be imposed only if answers to 
all of these questions are adverse to defendant. 
Texas court construed these requirements broadly -
to include age and prior criminal record, as well as other 
circumstances. 
We read statute to allow proof of all relevant 
mitigating circumstances. 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
January 23, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-6513, Bell v. Ohio 
I vote to reverse the judgment upholding imposition of the 
death penalty. I continue to adhere to my view, expressed in 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 1231, and Coker v. Georgia, 45 U.S.L.W. 4961, 4966, 
that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment 
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No. 76-6513 - Bell v. Ohio 
We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the 
imposition of the death penalty upon Willie Lee Bell pursuant 
to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Secs. 2929.01-.04 (1975 Rep. Vol.) 
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I. 
Bell was convicted of aggravated murder with the 
sp~cification that the murder occurred in the course of a 
kidnapping. He was sentenced to death. 
On October 16, 1974, Bell, who was then 16 years old, met a 
friend, Samuel Hall, who was then 18, at a youth center in 
Cincinnati, Ohio. They left the center and went to Hall's home 
where Hall borrowed a car and proceeded to drive Bell around 
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the area. They followed a car driven by 64 year old Julian 
Graber into a parking garage, and Hall, armed with a "sawed 
off" shotgun, forced Graber to surrender his car keys. Graber 
was placed, unharmed, into the trunk of his own car. Hall then 
drove Graber's car and Bell followed in Hall's car to the 
latter's home. There, Bell got into Graber's car with Hall 
and, following Hall's directions, drove to a nearby cemetery. 
A resident of an apartment near the cemetery saw Graber's 
car parked on the service road of the cemetery with its parking 
lights on. He heard two car doors close and then a voice 
screaming "don't shoot me, don't shoot me,'' followed by two 
shots. He saw someone return to Graber's ~ar and slide from 
the passenger's seat into the driver's seat. After observing 
Graber's car proceed away -- with lights off -- he called the 
police. 
The police found Graber lying face down in the cemetery 
with a massive wound on the back of his head and another on his 
right cheek. He died en route to the hospital. 
Although Bell did not testify at his trial, he gave his 
version of the killing to the police after his arrest in a 
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statement that was recorded and introduced at trial. Bell 
denied any intention to participate in a killing. He said tha t 
after he and Hall had parked in the cemetery, he had asked Hall 
what they were going to do next, and that Hall had r eplied, 
"we'll see, give me the keys." Hall then, according to Be ll, 
released Graber from the trunk and marched him into a forest e d 
area to the rear of the cemetery out of Bell's sight. Bell 
then heard Graber pleading for his life and heard a gunshot. 
According to Bell, Hall then came back to the car, reloaded th e 
gun, and returned to the wooded a rea. Bel l said he hea rd a 
second shot and Hall returned to the car and drove to Dayton, 
where they spent the night with friends of Hall. 
The next day, with Bell driving Graber's car, Bell and Hall 
stopped at a service station in Dayton. Hall used the shotg un 
to obtain the keys to the attendant's car, and forced the 
attendant into the trunk of his own car. Hall then drove the 
attendant's car away f r om the station with Bell following in 
Graber's car. A patrolman stoppe d the car that Hall was 
driving for a defective muffler and discovered the attendant in 
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the trunk. Bell drove past Hall and the officer and returned 
to Cincinnati where he abandoned Graber's car. 
After his arrest and indictment, Bell waived his right to a 
trial by jury and requested a trial by a three-judge panel. 
The panel unanimously found him guilty of aggravated murder and 
of the specification that the murder occurred in the course of 
a kidnapping. That offense required the death penalty under 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. 2929.03,2929.04, which is set forth in 
the Appendix to our opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, No. 76-6993, 
decided today. 
Pursuant to Ohio law, the panel ordered a presentence 
investigation and psychiatric examination of Bell. The 
psychiatrists' report was directed specifically to the three 
mitigating factors and concluded that none of them were 
present. It also noted, however, that Bell claimed not to have 
been aware of what Hall was doing when he shot Graber. 
The presentence report contained detailed information about 
the offense and about Bell's background, intelligence, prior 
offenses, character, and habits. It noted that Hall had 
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accused Bell of actually firing the shotgun at Graber and 
described Bell as having "low average or dull normal 
intellectual capacity." It noted that Bell had been cited in 
juvenile court for a series of prior offenses and had allegedly 
been using mescaline on the night of the offense. 
The three-judge panel permitted both sides the opportunity 
to introduce evidence and make arguments regarding the proper 
penalty. Bell testified that he had been under the influence 
of drugs virtually every day for three years prior to his 
arrest and on the night of the killing. He also said that he 
had viewed Hall as a "big brother" and had followed Hall's 
instructions because he had been "scared." Several of Bell's 
teachers testified that Bell had a drug problem and was 
emotionally unstable and immature for his age. 
The defense argued that Bell had acted out of fear and 
coercion and that the offense was due to Bell's mental 
deficiency. In support of his contention that Bell was 
mentally deficient, defense counsel argued that Bell's minority 
established mental deficiency as a matter of law; he also 
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argued that Bell was mentally deficient compared to other 
teenagers because of his drug problem and emotional instability 
and that Bell's mental deficiency contributed to his passive 
part in the crime. 
Prior to sentencing, Bell moved that the Ohio death penalty 
be declared unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, contending that the Ohio death penalty statute, 
which had been enacted after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972), severely limited the factors that would support an 
argument for mercy. Bell contended that his youth, the fact 
that he cooperated with the police, and the lack of proof that 
Bell participated in the actual killing strongly supported an 
argument for a penalty less than death in this case. He also 
contended that Ohio's post-Furman death penalty statute 
precluded him from requesting a lesser sentence on the basis of 
those factors . 
After considering the presentence and psychiatric reports 
as well as other evidence and the arguments of counsel, the 
panel concluded that none of the mitigating circumstances 
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defined by the Ohio statute had been established . . Accordingly, 
Bell was sentenced to death. 
In the Ohio Supreme Court, Bell unsuccessfully renewed his 
contention that the Ohio death penalty violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. He also contended, among other things, 
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction 
for aggravated murder because there was no proof of any intent 
on his part to kill or that he had aided and abetted Hall with 
the intent that Graber be killed. That court rejected the se 
arguments and held that the evidence that Bell had aided a nd 
abetted was sufficient to sustain the conviction because, under 
Ohio law, an aider and abettor could be prosecuted and punished 
as if he were the principal offender. Alternatively, the Court 
concluded that the trial panel might have reasonably conc l uded 
that Bell either committed or actively assisted in the murder. 
II. 
Bell contends that the Ohio death penalty statute viol a ted 
his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because 
it prevented the sentencing judges from considering the 
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particular circumstances of his crime and aspects of his 
character and record as mitigating factors. For the reasons 
stated in part III of our opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, supra, we 
have concluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of 
capital case, not be precluded from considering as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any 
aspect of the offense that the defendant proffers." We also 
concluded that "the Ohio death penalty statute does not permit 
the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors" 
that is required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We 
therefore agree with Bell's contention.~/ 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court is 
reversed to the extent that it upholds the imposition of the 
death penalty and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion and our opinion in Lockett 
v. Ohio, No. 76-6997, decided today. 
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Footnote 
:/ In view of ou r conclusion that Bell's death sentence 
cannot stand due to th e Ohio statute's limits on the 
consideration of mitig a ting circumstances, we do not addres s 
(a) Bell's contention that the death penalty is 
disproportionate as applied in this case or (b) his conte nt i on 
that the Ohio capital s e ntencing procedure violates the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendme nts because of an alleged lack of 
meaningful appellate review, b e c a use the jury does not 
participate in sente nci ng or becaus e the defendant mus t bear 
the risk of non-persuasion as to the existence of mitigating 
factors. 
Nor do we reach Bel l's contention that the procedure under 
which he was tried and sentenced infringe d his r ights under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because our grant of certio r ari 
in this case was limited to Eighth and Fourteenth Amendmen t 
issues. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHN QUIST 
June 27, 1978 
Re : No. 76-6513 - Bell v. Ohio; and No. 76-6993 - Lock e t t 
v . Ohio 
Dear Chief: 
As I told you on the telephone this morning, I found 
on my desk when I arrived your most recent draft in Lockett, 
and so far as I can tell your first circulation in Bell. I 
had prepared a dissent from your draft circulated last week 
in Lock ett, which I had hoped to circulate in Xerox form this 
morning. The new draft, insofar as I have been able to digest 
it, ma k es a n umber of changes which require me to alter my 
draft dissent. For example, its omission to treat and reject 
I 
the other attacks on the imposition of the sentence, which was 
a feature of last week's draft, requires me to treat and 
address them if I am to cast a vote to affirm or reverse in 
the case. 
I shall work as hard as I can in order to circulate a 
draft d i ssent which will be in time to have the case come down 
as scheduled on Friday, but with all t he other work confronting 
us this week I cannot guarantee that I will be successful. 
Sincerely,~ 
The Chi ef Justice 
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